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Note
In Deep Water: A Common Law Solution to the
Bulk Water Export Problem
Elise L. Larson
The end of a world without large-scale bulk water exports
may be near.1 Although previously deemed economically inconceivable, the growing problem of global water scarcity makes
the sale of bulk water—large-scale international shipment of
water by man-made diversion2—a potentially profitable enterprise.3 An American company recently announced its plan to
enter this newly developing market through its completion of a
contract with the town of Sitka, Alaska.4 The company plans to
export 2.9 billion gallons of freshwater per year from the Blue
Lake Reservoir to an unannounced water hub on the west coast
of India.5 If this venture is successful, the company will not only become the first in the United States to ship large-volume
exports of water by tanker, but the first in the world.6 Since
 J.D. Candidate 2012, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2009,
Concordia College. The author thanks Professor Bradley Karkkainen for his
advice and guidance, and Jeremy Harrell, Laura Arneson, and Nathan Wersal
for their helpful comments throughout the process. Copyright © 2011 by Elise
L. Larson.
1. See, e.g., Brett Walton, Alaska City Set to Ship Water to India, U.S.
Company Announces, CIRCLE OF BLUE WATERNEWS (July 11, 2010, 2:49 PM),
http://www.circleofblue.org/waternews/2010/world/north-america/alaska-city-setto-ship-water-to-india-u-s-company-announces/.
2. This definition of bulk water will be used throughout this Note.
3. See Ariel Dinar & Aaron Wolf, International Markets for Water and
Potential for Regional Cooperation: Economic and Political Perspectives in the
Western Middle East, 43 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 43, 43, 61–62
(1994) (finding that, with developments in technology, the application economic models to trade in water resources may show increased regional developments in some areas of the world). See generally U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006: BEYOND SCARCITY 134 –37 (2006), available
at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR06-complete.pdf (discussing the current
and future problems relating to water scarcity around the world).
4. Walton, supra note 1.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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this plan was announced, the Alaska Department of Natural
Resources received three new applications to remove Alaskan
water for international trade.7 These permit applications illustrate a growing international trend: as water resources are
depleted, water-poor areas around the world will search for opportunities to purchase water as a commodity.8 This new thirst
for bulk water will undoubtedly encourage the expansion of this
industry, creating new conflicts between the states‘ traditional
authority to regulate their water resources and the limits
placed on water resources if subject to international trade
agreements.
Many scholars hypothesize about the impact international
agreements may have on traditional water right structures in
the United States. One concern is that the actual export of water internationally may cause ―bulk water‖ to be defined as a
―good‖ or ―product‖ subject to the North American Free Trade
Agreement9 (NAFTA) and the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade10 (GATT).11 This categorization may result in the
potentially serious domestic consequence of limiting a state‘s
ability to regulate its water resources.12 Other consequences
may include: discouraging investment by domestic companies;
injuring ecosystems;13 and infringing upon the availability to
the public of its most valuable resource.14
7. Brett Walton, Alaska Receives New Applications for Bulk Water Removal, CIRCLE OF BLUE WATERNEWS (July 8, 2010, 11:45 AM), http://www
.circleofblue.org/waternews/2010/world/north-america/alaska-receives-new
-applications-for-bulk-water-removal/.
8. Cynthia Baumann, Water Wars: Canada’s Upstream Battle to Ban
Bulk Water Export, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 109, 109 (2001).
9. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 301, Dec.
17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
10. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. xi, Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT ].
11. See Scott Philip Little, Canada’s Capacity to Control the Flow: Water
Export and the North American Free Trade Agreement, 8 PACE INT‘L L. REV.
127, 139– 41 (1996).
12. See Noah D. Hall, Protecting Freshwater Resources in the Era of Global Water Markets: Lessons Learned from Bottled Water, 13 U. DENV. WATER L.
REV. 1, 2–7 (2009) (discussing the potential harm to society and the environment through the removal of water for bottling).
13. See POLICY RESEARCH INITIATIVE, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
BRIEFING NOTE: EXPORTING CANADA‘S WATER I: OUTSIDE OF NAFTA, at 3
(2005), available at http://www.horizons.gc.ca/doclib/SD_BN_ExportingWater_E
.pdf (describing the potential environmental risks associated with bulk water
shipment).
14. See Baumann, supra note 8, at 129.
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The power to protect water resources under international
trade lies largely in the hands of state governments because
water rights are a form of property.15 States‘ police powers allow them to control property rights in water resources through
statute, regulation, and permitting systems.16 Traditionally,
state legislative power restricts the amount of water that becomes an article of commerce because a resource must be extracted, used, and incorporated into a product before it becomes
a ―good‖ for the purposes of trade law.17 However, state and local governments also have an incentive to allow the export of
bulk water for short-term financial gain.18 This Note argues
that because the legislature both holds the power to distribute
water rights and possesses the potential to benefit financially
by selling those rights in international trade, further protections are needed to prevent the allocation of state water resources for bulk export.
In Part I, this Note provides a brief overview of NAFTA
and GATT, and their potential interference with the state regulation of water resources. This Part also supplies a brief overview of global water scarcity, American water law, and the public trust doctrine. Part II discusses the circumstances under
which state and federal courts have applied the public trust
doctrine and how this movement is applicable to bulk water exports. Part III asserts that the best remedy to solve the tension
between international-trade law and state regulation of water
resources is for state courts to apply the public trust doctrine to
the allocation of permits for international trade.
I. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN WATER AND THEIR INTERPLAY
WITH INTERNATIONAL TREATIES
Global water scarcity is the fuel driving the new market of
bulk water export.19 This Part describes this growing problem.
As the bulk water market grows, exporting this resource will
impact both the economic and political spheres of countries
around the world. In the United States, the export of bulk15. See Scott S. Slater, State Water Resource Administration in the Free
Trade Agreement Era: As Strong as Ever, 53 WAYNE L. REV. 649, 651–54
(2007).
16. See id.
17. Hall, supra note 12, at 3.
18. The city of Sitka, Alaska, for example, has the potential to make $90
million per year by exporting bulk water. Walton, supra note 1.
19. See Baumann, supra note 8.
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water forms the intersection of three large bodies of law: first,
state water rights20 under the police powers giving state legislatures the authority to regulate and permit the waters within
their territories; second, international trade law under NAFTA
and GATT; and third, common law doctrines, specifically the
public trust doctrine. This Part provides a discussion of these
areas of law and describes how each applies to bulk water
exports.
A. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF GLOBAL WATER SCARCITY
Water is a unique natural resource in both the variety and
importance of the needs it satisfies.21 Water‘s array of essential
functions include: providing sustenance to humans, crops, and
livestock; creating habitat for fish and other aquatic organisms;
fulfilling both recreational and aesthetic needs; and purifying
the air.22 This diversity of uses creates competition among water users, especially since, as one commentator noted, ―there is
not always enough water of the right quality in the right place
at the right time.‖23 Uneven geographical distribution is exacerbated by population growth, climate change, and overpumping domestic resources causing global water scarcity in
certain regions of the world.24 As a result, the World Health
Organization estimates that over one billion people lack access
to a basic water supply.25 This number is expected to increase
to three billion people by 2025 as water stress increases in
parts of China, India, and Sub-Saharan Africa.26 As a consequence, lack of this essential resource drives the new market
for bulk water.27
As this market develops, American legislators and courts
must determine how domestic law and policy will respond to
20. See generally WILLIAM GOLDFARB, WATER LAW 10–11 (2d ed. 1988)
(explaining that water rights are legal rights and that ―a legal right is a legally enforceable expectation,‖ meaning ―that other people have enforceable duties toward a rightholder‖).
21. See, e.g., DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 1 (3d ed.
1997).
22. See, e.g., id.
23. Id.
24. Note, What Price for the Priceless?: Implementing the Justiciability of
the Right to Water, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1067, 1070 (2007).
25. See WORLD HEALTH ORG. & U.N. CHILDREN‘S FUND, GLOBAL WATER
SUPPLY AND SANITATION ASSESSMENT 2000 REPORT 1 (2000), available at
http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/monitoring/jmp2000.pdf.
26. U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 3, at 14.
27. See Baumann, supra note 8.
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the growing international need for freshwater resources. In relation to state rights, water exports will interact with both statutory water rights and judicial common law doctrines as water
is redefined within this new market and by the terms of international treaties.
B. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF WATER RIGHTS IN THE UNITED
STATES
Two fundamental aspects of American water law are essential to a discussion of bulk water exports. First, water rights
are a species of property rights28 and are subject to the police
powers of a state.29 As a result, state common and statutory
law determines the terms and conditions by which water rights
are obtained.30 Second, water rights are usufructuary rights,
meaning other people have the right to the benefits of another‘s
water.31 This means a legal right to remove water must be exercised with deference to the impact of one‘s use upon other water right holders,32 the public at large,33 and the environment.34
This Section explains these two aspects of water law.

28. See, e.g., Fed. Land Bank of Spokane v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 29
P.2d 1009, 1011 (Idaho 1934) (―A water right is real property . . . .‖ (citation
omitted)); N. Ohio Traction & Light Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 152 N.E. 5, 9
(Ohio 1926) (―A water right is a species of property in and of itself . . . .‖ (citation omitted)).
29. See Slater, supra note 15, at 661.
30. Id. at 665–66.
31. BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1685 (9th ed. 2009); see also, e.g., Eddy v.
Simpson, 3 Cal. 249, 252 (1853) (―[ T ]he right of property in water is usufructuary . . . .‖ (emphasis omitted)).
32. E.g., Bernard v. City of St. Louis, 189 N.W. 891, 893 (Mich. 1922)
(holding that right holders are required only ―not to interfere with an adequate supply of water for the plaintiffs‘ reasonable use‖); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 850, 850A (2010).
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (1979); see also, e.g., Diack
v. City of Portland, 759 P.2d 1070, 1078 (Or. 1988) (holding the commissioner
must consider ―[t]he prevention of wasteful, uneconomic, impracticable or unreasonable use of waters involved‖ when looking at the public interest); State
v. Bleck, 338 N.W.2d 492, 498 (Wis. 1983) (holding that the subordinate rights
of riparian owners are ―subject to the public‘s paramount right and interest‖).
34. See, e.g., Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441, 448– 49 (Idaho 1985) (citing
Idaho law requiring environmental considerations when issuing permits for
water rights); In re Eigenheer, 453 N.W.2d 349, 354 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990)
(holding that the Minnesota permitting system must conserve the ―valuable
resource‖ (citation omitted)); Stempel v. Dep‘t of Water Res., 508 P.2d 166, 172
(Wash. 1973) (applying Washington law to find that permits may be issued
only if conditioned on the protection of the health of the natural environment).
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Under the state police powers, a person obtains water
rights in a variety of ways.35 Generally, water-right regimes
can be split into three categories: (1) common law riparian; (2)
riparian with administrative permitting; and (3) prior appropriation.36 The basic premise of riparian common law is that a
riparian owner—a person owning land which borders a stream
or lake—has the right to take water for use on her land.37 The
right to extract water is a consequence of riparian land ownership.38 As a result, water rights cannot be lost by disuse because the right is tied to the ownership of a specific kind of
property.39
The nature of the riparian system puts non-riparians with
water needs at a severe disadvantage because water rights are
attained through property ownership and are not transferable.40 Thus, many common law riparian states have enacted
administrative-permitting systems to allocate water outside the
common
law
regime.41
Under
this
riparian-withadministrative-permitting system, non-riparians can acquire
water right by obtaining permits from a state administrative
agency.42
The last major water allocation system is known as the
prior appropriations doctrine.43 Under common law prior appropriations, water rights are not obtained through land ownership; instead, taking water and applying it to a beneficial use
is the only way to acquire it.44 Most prior appropriation states
have adopted this doctrine by statute.45 Generally, these statu35. See Slater, supra note 15, at 664.
36. See GOLDFARB, supra note 20, at 26, 33.
37. J.W. Milliman, Water Law and Private Decision-Making: A Critique, 2
J.L. & ECON. 41, 42 (1959).
38. Id. Within this general category, owners of riparian water rights may
be subject to one of two allocation theories, natural flow or reasonable use. See
GOLDFARB, supra note 20, at 22–24. These allocation methods are the terms
by which a riparian owner‘s right is impinged by the public‘s usufructuary
rights, discussed later in this section. See id.
39. See JOSEPH L. SAX, WATER LAW, PLANNING & POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (1968).
40. GOLDFARB, supra note 20, at 24.
41. See George William Sherk, Eastern Water Law, 1 NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV‘T, Winter 1986, at 7, 9.
42. See GOLDFARB, supra note 20, at 26.
43. See SAX, supra note 39, at 2.
44. See Milliman, supra note 37, at 42– 43.
45. See Amber L. Weeks, Student Article, Defining the Public Interest:
Administrative Narrowing and Broadening of the Public Interest in Response
to Statutory Silence of Water Codes, 50 NAT. RESOURCES J. 255, 259 (2010)
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tory formulations approve appropriations in water, determine
priorities for allotment, and administer the right to distribute
water.46 Regardless of the type of system used, each state prescribes a set of terms and conditions by which a person may obtain water rights.47
Once an individual obtains a water right, it is not absolute
because water is usufructuary and therefore remains subject to
public ownership to a certain degree.48 As one commentator
noted, ―[w]ater is legally and historically a public resource,‖49
meaning that water in its natural state is considered public
property and belongs to the citizens of the state collectively.50
This gives the state power to regulate water use against its own
citizens and the federal government regardless of whether that
party owns the right to remove water.51 Therefore, a property
right in water is distinguishable from that in land because the
owner has a right to the use of the resource, but not to the actual property itself.52
Therefore, the state has customarily housed the power to
regulate water resources through both allocation methods and
enforcement of other citizens‘ rights. With the development of
the bulk water export market, this structure may change as it
is forced to interact with international agreements. The next
(―Every prior appropriation state except for Colorado has delegated quasijudicial authority to state administrative agencies or state engineers to administer both new allocations, or permits, and changes in water rights, or
transfers.‖).
46. See SAX, supra note 39, at 2–3.
47. Slater, supra note 15, at 665.
48. See id. at 650, 662–63 (―[ W ]hether water rights are derived as an incident of land ownership or by compliance with common law or statutory requirements, they are usufructuary property rights in a shared public resource and vest only to make use of the common supply and, even then, not
without regard to the impact of one‘s use upon others and the environment.‖).
49. GETCHES, supra note 21, at 11.
50. GOLDFARB, supra note 20, at 11; e.g., State v. Bleck, 338 N.W.2d 492,
498 (Wis. 1983) (holding that the subordinate rights of riparian owners are
―subject to the public‘s paramount right and interest‖).
51. GOLDFARB, supra note 20, at 11. It should be noted that the states are
subject to the Takings Clause if they appropriate water once water rights are
vested in a private party. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dept.
of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2601 (2010) (holding that the Takings Clause
applies to the taking of a landowner‘s riparian rights); Yates v. Milwaukee, 77
U.S. 497, 504 (1870).
52. See Town of Chino Valley v. Prescott, 638 P.2d 1324, 1328 (Ariz. 1981)
(holding that the right to groundwater is usufructuary); Rock Creek Ditch &
Flume Co. v. Miller, 17 P.2d 1074, 1076–77 (Mont. 1933) (holding that the
owner of a water right does not own the corpus of the stream).
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Section will discuss two major trading agreements and how
they may impact the current American water-rights structure.
C. IMPLICATIONS OF GATT AND NAFTA ON AMERICAN WATER
RESOURCES
Historically, water has not been exported in bulk and,
therefore, concern that international agreements would interact with domestic regulatory regimes was minimal.53 However,
with the spawning of a new market in bulk water export, the
potential interaction of these two bodies of law could reduce the
ability of domestic law to regulate resources over which it traditionally had full control.
1. Application of GATT to Bulk Water Export
Originally designed to provide an international forum to
encourage free trade and resolve trade disputes, GATT was the
initial step toward the development of a worldwide trade regime.54 With the formation of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) in 1994, GATT now provides the basic legal structure
that governs international trade between WTO members.55
GATT defines all commodities that may be traded by WTO
members in the ―Harmonized Tariff Schedule‖ (HTS).56 Freshwater is included under Section 2201.57 This inclusion is relevant to the discussion of bulk water because ―[t]he existence of
an HTS number means that there is a mechanism under which
shipments of fresh water can be processed by . . . customs or-

53. Cf. Dinar & Wolf, supra note 3, at 43 (finding that technology allows
an export market in water).
54. Rona Nardone, Like Oil and Water: The WTO and the World’s Water
Resources, 19 CONN. J. INT‘L L. 183, 198 (2003).
55. Slater, supra note 15, at 655–56. At the time this Note was written,
the agreement governs the trade relations between 153 countries. Members
and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG. (July 23, 2008), http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm.
56. PETER H. GLEICK ET AL., THE NEW ECONOMY OF WATER: THE RISKS
AND BENEFITS OF GLOBALIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION OF FRESH WATER 16
(2002), available at http://www.pacinst.org/reports/new_economy_of_water/new_
economy_of_water.pdf; see also Jerome Hinkle, Troubled Waters: Policy and Action in the Great Lakes, 20 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 281, 299 (2003).
57. Section 2201 defines water as ―including natural or artificial mineral
waters and aerated waters, not containing added sugar or other sweetening
matter nor flavored; ice and snow.‖ U.S. INT‘L TRADE COMM‘N, PUB. NO. 4201,
HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES, at ch. 22-3 (1st rev.
ann. 2011), available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/docs/tata/hts/bychapter/
1101htsa.pdf.
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ganizations . . . .‖58 Therefore, at least in theory, GATT already
has a structure to support trade in bulk water.59
With the formation of a new bulk water market, it is feared
that GATT Article XI may supersede state regulation of water
once one member allows exportation.60 Article XI, Section 1
states:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other
measures . . . shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting
party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other
contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party.61

Article XI, Section 1, then prevents states from prohibiting
or restricting the export of the ―good‖ and requires continued
trading even if exports are damaging to the environment.62 If a
nation decides to allow private companies to ship water in bulk,
as currently written, Article XI would play a major role in determining the ability of governments to regulate their own
freshwater resources.
Other portions of GATT may also apply to the export of
bulk water because the treaty creates exceptions for ―exhaustible‖ resources.63 For example, Article XX, Sections (b) and (g)
allows domestic protection of freshwater resources for ―‗exhaustible natural resources‘ or resources that are ‗necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health.‘‖64 However, to limit
exports in this manner, the national government must also restrict domestic consumption to show the policy is in defense of
natural resources and not at matter of economic protectionism.65 Therefore, even with the provisions intended to protect
58. GLEICK ET AL., supra note 56.
59. See id.
60. See Slater, supra note 15, at 657–59.
61. GATT, supra note 10, 55 U.N.T.S. at 224 –26.
62. Robert J. Girouard, Water Export Restrictions: A Case Study of WTO
Dispute Settlement Strategies and Outcomes, 15 GEO. INT‘L ENVTL. L. REV.
247, 252 (2002).
63. Nardone, supra note 54, at 200. See generally GLEICK ET AL., supra
note 56, at 5 (articulating how water can be both a renewable and nonrenewable resource).
64. Nardone, supra note 54, at 200 (quoting GATT, supra note 10, 55
U.N.T.S. at 262).
65. Id. at 200–01. GATT Article XX must be read in conjunction with the
introductory clauses of the Article, so exceptions cannot be ―applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries.‖ PAUL B. STEPHAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
AND ECONOMICS LAW AND POLICY 912–13 (3d ed. 2004) (quoting and discussing GATT, supra note 10, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262).

748

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[96:739

exhaustible resources from exploitation, GATT may limit the
ability of states to regulate their waters for the benefit of citizens at large.
However, the shipment of bulk water not only implicates
GATT, but also NAFTA. The next Subsection will discuss how
application of NAFTA to bulk water export is both related to
and different from application under GATT.
2. Application of NAFTA to Bulk Water Export
NAFTA is an international trade agreement between Mexico, Canada, and the United States.66 This agreement is essentially a regional extension of GATT 67 that seeks to lower trade
barriers, promote fair competition, increase cross-border investment, and create a forum for dispute resolution.68
Chapter Three of NAFTA requires that each party ―accord
national treatment to the goods of another Party in accordance
with Article III‖ of GATT.69 This incorporation of GATT ―require[s] the national treatment of goods and prohibit[s] quantitative restrictions on imports and exports of products.‖70 This
language could prevent all three members of NAFTA from
enacting import-export restrictions on water traded in bulk, regardless of damage to the environment or limitations on the local population‘s water supply needs.71
Chapter 11 of NAFTA also has implications for bulk water,
because it forces nations to afford foreign and domestic investors equal treatment under trade law.72 Under Article 1102 of
NAFTA, parties are required to ―extend treatment no less favorable to investors and investments of another Party than
that which is accorded to similar [domestic] interests.‖73 Thus,
66. Slater, supra note 15, at 656.
67. GLEICK ET AL., supra note 56, at 18.
68. Slater, supra note 15, at 656.
69. NAFTA, supra note 9, 32 I.L.M. at 299–301.
70. Slater, supra note 15, at 656.
71. See Baumann, supra note 8, at 114 –17, 119–23 (analyzing the potential effect of GATT and NAFTA on Canada‘s efforts to ban bulk water exports);
Sanford E. Gaines, Fresh Water: Environment or Trade?, 28 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 157
(2002); J. Owen Saunders, Trade Agreements and Environmental Sovereignty:
Case Studies from Canada, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1171 (1995); Marcia Valiante, Harmonization of Great Lakes Water Management in the Shadow of
NAFTA, 81 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 525, 534 (2004).
72. Brian D. Anderson, Selling Great Lakes Water to a Thirsty World: Legal, Policy, & Trade Considerations, 2 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 215, 241 (1999).
73. Little, supra note 11, at 144; see also NAFTA, supra note 9, 32 I.L.M.
at 639.
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each state must accord the same rights to remove water to foreign investors as it does to domestic investors if bulk water is
subject to NAFTA.74 This provision will restrict the number of
permits available to domestic parties because the state must
distribute only a finite number of permits to ensure they do not
damage the local water supply.75
After the passage of NAFTA, the Canadian government asserted their concern that the language of the agreement would
subject both the United States and Mexico to ―unlimited access
to [the country‘s] fresh water resources.‖76 In order to assuage
this concern, the federal governments of Canada, the United
States, and Mexico made a joint public statement in 1993 stating that NAFTA does not apply to bulk water exports.77 However, this joint statement is ―completely non-binding upon the
parties.‖78 The U.S. Department of State has said ―governments
may agree on joint statements of policy or intention that do not
establish legal obligations.‖79 Thus, the 1993 joint statement
does not bind the United States, Mexico, and Canada, and the
NAFTA provisions still apply to the export of bulk water.80
Provisions of both NAFTA and GATT could impact the
states‘ traditional legal authority to regulate water resources.
By creating this new tension between international and domestic frameworks, it is necessary to develop a solution to ensure
that citizens of the United States are protected from the potential local impact.
D. HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND MODERN
CONCEPTIONS
State governments in water rich states have an economic
incentive to sell water in bulk to private enterprises.81 Nothing,
74. Little, supra note 11, at 146.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 127.
77. Christopher Scott Maravilla, The Canadian Bulk Water Moratorium
and Its Implications for NAFTA, CURRENTS: INT‘L TRADE L.J., Summer 2001,
at 29, 35. To view the actual joint statement itself, see David Johansen, Water
Exports and the NAFTA, CAN. (Mar. 8, 1999), http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/
Collection-R/LoPBdP/EB/prb995-e.htm.
78. Maravilla, supra note 77.
79. Memorandum from Robert E. Dalton, Assistant Legal Advisor for
Treaty Affairs, U.S. Dep‘t of State, International Documents of a Non-Legally
Binding Character 1 (Mar. 18, 1994), available at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/65728.pdf.
80. Maravilla, supra note 77.
81. Cf. Steve Maich, America Is Thirsty, MACLEAN‘S MAG., Nov. 28, 2005,
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however, assures that legislative or administrative officials
adequately consider the public interest when determining
whether to issue permits for bulk water export.82 As a result,
the public trust doctrine is viable remedy to the potential consequences of bulk water export.83 This conflict illuminates a potential public trust concern: government may have economic
motives that are not in the best interest of the public. This Section will first describe the establishment of the American public
trust doctrine. The Section continues to describe the scope of
the public trust doctrine, specifically, how the Supreme Court
has given state courts the discretion to determine what resources are protected by the doctrine and how jurisdictions
vary from traditional to broad interpretations.
1. Establishment of the American Public Trust Doctrine
The underlying premise behind the public trust doctrine is
that some resources are always subject to ownership and protection by the state in trust for the benefit of the public.84 The
public trust doctrine was assimilated into United States law
from English common law.85 Early English decisions assumed
this doctrine was limited to property rights in rivers, seas, and
seashores that were to be preserved for the public to navigate,
fish, or use for other purposes.86 The existence of this doctrine
was confirmed in 1892 by the Supreme Court in Illinois Central
Railroad Co. v. Illinois.87 The Court held that the public trust
doctrine limited the state‘s ability to sell or relinquish control
over submerged lands because they are held ―in trust‖ for the

at 28–30 (reporting that various businesses wanted to buy water from Canada
to sell to the United States).
82. Cf. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law:
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 473, 495 (1970) (―[ I ]t will often be the case that the whole of the public interest has not been adequately
considered by the [government] whose conduct has been brought into question.‖).
83. Cf. id. at 495–96 (discussing how the public trust doctrine would
―create through the courts an openness and visibility which is the public‘s
principal protection against overreaching‖).
84. Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing
Rights and Integrating Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 702 (2006).
85. See generally Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of
the American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central,
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799, 828 (2004) (discussing the English common law and its
application to states).
86. Klass, supra note 84.
87. 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
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public.88 Most importantly, the case explicitly stated that the
public trust doctrine can override a state statute.89
2. Contemporary Scope of the Public Trust Doctrine
Once a court holds that specific natural resources are held
―in trust,‖ the sovereign has specific duties that are judicially
enforceable by the public.90 A ruling of this kind creates a state
duty to preserve and protect the public‘s interest in the resource.91 The doctrine protects these interests by restricting
government authority in three ways:
first, the property subject to the trust must not only be used for a public purpose, but it must be held available for use by the general public; second, the property may not be sold, even for a fair cash equivalent; and third, the property must be maintained for particular types
of uses.92

Even though the public trust doctrine affords a resource
broad protection under the common law, the Supreme Court
held that each state defines the reach and application of the
public trust doctrine within its borders.93 As a result, the scope
of the doctrine varies considerably from state to state.94
Whereas some states have taken a restricted view of the doctrine, others have interpreted it more broadly.95
Some state courts have limited the scope of the public trust
doctrine to the historically recognized areas of navigation and
fishing.96 The traditional arguments for maintaining this narrow scope are the doctrine‘s ―undemocratic nature,‖ the power
88. Id.
89. Klass, supra note 84, at 705.
90. Allan Kanner, The Public Trust Doctrine, Parens Patriae, and the Attorney General as the Guardian of the State’s Natural Resources, 16 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y F. 57, 75 (2005).
91. Id. at 77.
92. Sax, supra note 82, at 477.
93. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 483 (1988)
(citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 24 (1893)).
94. See Kanner, supra note 90, at 78 (―[A] state has the right to define the
nature and extent of its property under the common law relating to water interests.‖); Klass, supra note 84 (finding that the public trust doctrine allows
―variations in scope among the states‖).
95. Kanner, supra note 90, at 78.
96. See, e.g., Dep‘t of Natural Res. v. Mayor of Ocean City, 332 A.2d 630,
637–38 (Md. 1975) (refusing to extend the public trust doctrine to dry land although the land at issue was legally considered a part of the waterfront and
had been improved at the public‘s expense); Op. of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d
561, 566 (Mass. 1974) (refusing to extend the public trust doctrine to beach
walking).
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it gives ―noncompetent‖ courts over highly complex administrative decisions, and the danger that courts will undervalue private property rights.97 Other state courts have chosen to expand the public trust doctrine beyond the traditional view.98
Expansions have included defending use, access, and preservation of waters which are used for wildlife habitat,99 drinking
water,100 recreation,101 and inland wetlands.102 Most relevant to
this Note, some states have also applied this doctrine to resolve
water appropriation issues and have limited preexisting water
rights to prevent impermissible limitations on public access, as
well as harm to the environment, aesthetics, or other natural
resources.103
Although the public trust doctrine has been significantly
broadened in some states, other jurisdictions are reluctant to
protect resources outside the traditional scope.104 Because the
97. William D. Araiza, Democracy, Distrust, and the Public Trust: ProcessBased Constitutional Theory, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Search for a
Substantive Environmental Value, 45 UCLA L. REV. 385, 403 (1997).
98. Klass, supra note 84, at 707–08.
99. See, e.g., Pullen v. Ulmer, 923 P.2d 54, 61 (Alaska 1996) (holding that
wildlife ―occurring in their natural state‖ were ―public assets of the state
which may not be appropriated by initiative‖); Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d
374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (describing tidelands as belonging within the public trust
because they are ―environments which provide food and habitat for birds and
marine life‖).
100. See, e.g., Mayor of Clifton v. Passaic Valley Water Comm‘n, 539 A.2d
760, 765 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) (―[ T ]he public trust doctrine applies
with equal impact upon the control of our drinking water reserves.‖), aff ’d, 557
A.2d 299 (N.J. 1989).
101. See, e.g., Mont. Coal. for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171
(Mont. 1984) ( protecting surface waters capable of recreational use under the
public trust doctrine, ―without regard to streambed ownership or navigability
for nonrecreational purposes‖).
102. See, e.g., Just v. Marinette Cnty., 201 N.W.2d 761, 769 (Wis. 1972)
(finding that swamp lands ―adjacent to or near navigable waters‖ were subject
to regulation under the state public trust powers).
103. See, e.g., CWC Fisheries, Inc. v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115, 1121 (Alaska
1988) (finding ―continuing public easements‖ to protect public access to tidelands); In re Wai‗ola O Moloka‗i, Inc., 83 P.3d 664, 694 (Haw. 2004) (holding
that reservations of water by a state agency were entitled to protection under
the public trust doctrine); Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441, 450 (Idaho 1985)
(finding that the aesthetic and environmental impacts of a permit grant may
be given ―great consideration‖ where those priorities match local needs); United Plainsmen Ass‘n v. N.D. State Water Conservation Comm‘n, 247 N.W.2d
457, 463 (N.D. 1976) (finding that the public trust doctrine requires some evidence of ―an analysis of present supply and future need‖ before water resources are allocated).
104. See Kanner, supra note 90, at 78 (introducing different jurisdictions‘
approaches to applying the public trust doctrine).
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sale of bulk water implicates many of the concerns hallmarked
in traditional public trust precedent, the central argument of
this paper focuses on jurisdictions that narrowly interpret the
public trust doctrine. This Note posits that expansion of the
public trust doctrine to bulk water exports is narrower than
more liberal extensions because it is tailored to resolve traditional concerns. As such, this Note encourages conservative jurisdictions to apply the public trust doctrine to bulk water
exports.
II. JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC
TRUST DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court gave state courts the discretion to extend or limit the public trust doctrine.105 Therefore, the use of
the public trust doctrine to protect a state‘s natural resources
varies by jurisdiction.106 In order to convince jurisdictions to extend the public trust doctrine to the appropriation of water
rights for bulk export, it is necessary to understand the circumstances where courts have extended the doctrine and how
the concerns of more conservative jurisdictions can be alleviated. This Part first discusses circumstances under which
courts have extended the doctrine to protect the public interest
in a resource and provides support for these extensions. Next, it
argues that the concerns cited by jurisdictions following the
traditional approach are not implicated by extension to bulk
water exports. Finding that bulk water exports implicate traditional concerns about public resources, the Part concludes that
applying the public trust doctrine is in keeping with the traditional application of the doctrine by courts.
A. CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH COURTS HAVE APPLIED THE
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
An assessment of the circumstances where courts apply the
public trust doctrine is necessary to argue that this doctrine
should be applied to bulk water sales. This Section outlines
105. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 483 (1988)
(―[ T ]here is no universal and uniform law upon the subject; but . . . each State
has dealt with the lands under the tide waters within its borders according to
its own views of justice and policy.‖ (quoting Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26
(1894))).
106. Ivan M. Stoner, Comment, Leading a Judge to Water: In Search of a
More Fully Formed Washington Public Trust Doctrine, 85 WASH. L. REV. 391,
399– 400 (2010).

754

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[96:739

(1) how using the doctrine would prevent the government from
selling a public resource for temporary economic gain, and (2)
why some states have already applied the public trust doctrine
to the appropriation of water.
1. Federal Application of the Public Trust Doctrine:
Prohibition of the Export of a Traditionally Public Resource for
Temporary Economic Gain
In Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, the Supreme
Court affirmed the enforceability of the public trust doctrine
against state legislative actions regarding submerged lands.107
There are two reasons this case has important implications for
bulk water. First, the case articulated that the doctrine can
override state legislative actions, unlike most common law
principles which can be superseded by statute.108 Second, the
case houses significant parallels to bulk water exports in the
kind of legislative power used and the effect that power had on
the public‘s future use of the resource.
Illinois Central addressed an 1869 grant, by the Illinois
legislature, of an interest in more than one thousand acres of
submerged land within the Chicago Harbor to Illinois Central
Railroad.109 In 1873, lawmakers changed their minds and repealed the grant, and the State brought a quiet title action
against the railroad in 1883.110 The Supreme Court upheld the
State‘s ability to repeal the 1869 grant, deeming the initial
grant invalid under the public trust doctrine.111
Although the Court affirmed the State‘s title to the lands
under Lake Michigan,112 the Court determined that title was
―different in character‖ from other state-owned lands that can
be sold to private parties.113 As a result, the Court found that
―the state‘s control of such lands, for purposes of the trust, ‗can
never be lost,‘ unless conveyed for uses promoting the interest
107. See supra notes 87–89 and accompanying text.
108. See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453, 455 (1892) (making broad references to ―the State‖ and that ―[a]ny grant of the kind is necessarily revocable‖).
109. Id. at 438–39, 454; see also Klass, supra note 84, at 703–04; Sax, supra
note 82, at 489.
110. See Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 433, 449, 460–61.
111. Id. at 454 –55, 463–64; Klass, supra note 84, at 704.
112. The Court expressly found that submerged lands included not only
tidelands, but also the Great Lakes and other key inland water bodies. Ill.
Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 435–37.
113. Id. at 452.

2011]

BULK WATER EXPORT PROBLEM

755

of the public.‖114 The Court did not, therefore, prohibit the
State from selling the land to private parties.115 Instead, the
Court decreed that ―[w]hat a state may not do . . . is to divest
itself of authority to govern the whole of an area in which it has
responsibility to exercise its police power.‖116 Like Illinois Central, a state‘s action to allow water to be shipped in bulk also
involves governments rescinding control over a previously regulated resource to achieve a short-term economic gain.117 By
permitting bulk water shipments, a state government may potentially renounce its right to allocate water resources as it
deems fit.118 Consequently, the state loses a right which was
solely under its control.119 Thus, the state ―divest[s] itself of authority to govern the whole of an area in which it has responsibility to exercise its police power;‖ a circumstance not permitted under Illinois Central.120
The state grant in Illinois Central also resembles the potential consequences of bulk water export because the legislative action did not create public developments or produce more
efficient services for the public.121 Likewise, issuing bulk water
permit for export does not provide the benefits to the public for
several reasons. First, bulk water exports operate with little
long-term labor.122 Thus, relative to other water allocation industries, such as bottled water, the bulk water industry would
114. Klass, supra note 84, at 704 (quoting Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 453).
115. See Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 453 (―[ T ]he control of the State for the
purposes of the trust can never be lost, except as to such parcels as are used in
promoting the interests of the public therein, or can be disposed of without any
substantial impairment of the public interest . . . .‖).
116. Sax, supra note 82, at 489.
117. Cf. Klass, supra note 84, at 705 (―Putting aside its legal groundings,
Illinois Central stands as an early invocation of the public trust doctrine to
prevent a state from placing public trust lands into private hands for shortterm economic gain to the detriment of the long-term preservation of the resource for the public.‖).
118. See Jamie W. Boyd, Note, Canada’s Position Regarding an Emerging
International Fresh Water Market with Respect to the North American Free
Trade Agreement, 5 NAFTA: L. & BUS. L. REV. AMS. 325, 336 (1999) (arguing
that under certain provisions of NAFTA ―Canada could lose control over future
water export projects, however large or small‖).
119. See GOLDFARB, supra note 20, at 11.
120. See Sax, supra note 82, at 489.
121. See id. at 490.
122. See ANDREW NIKIFORUK, PROGRAM ON WATER ISSUES, ON THE TABLE:
WATER, ENERGY AND NORTH AMERICAN INTEGRATION 19 (Sept. 4, 2007),
http://www.powi.ca/pdfs/events/powi20070910_9am_On_the_Table.pdf (discussing how and why the number of jobs created in a bulk water market for Canada
would be ―minimal‖).
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provide very few jobs to members of the public.123 The operation
of exporting bulk water could also depress development in the
domestic economy by limiting the number of available permits
for domestic industries.124 Therefore, the government‘s permission to sell water in bulk is similar to Illinois‘s decision to sell
the land under its harbor because the water permit would not
properly promote the interest of the public.
The parallels between Illinois Central and the developing
issues related to bulk water export illustrate how this new
market implicates traditional public trust concerns. As discussed below, applying the doctrine to bulk water export does
not force a state court to make highly complex environmental
decisions or frustrate private property rights to the same degree as other extensions. Jurisdictions that apply the doctrine
to water appropriation more extensively do, however, provide
compelling arguments for why conservative state courts should
extend the doctrine to bulk water export.
2. Application of the Public Trust Doctrine to Water Uses
The extension of the public trust doctrine is especially important in the area of water law.125 Because water is necessary
for survival and critical for economic development,126 it is obvious that states must regulate the tensions between appropriation for historical uses and for modern development.127 How123. Id. (―The number of jobs created [through bulk water exports] would
be minimal and would be largely confined to the maintenance of ships or pipelines.‖); cf. POLICY RESEARCH INITIATIVE, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT BRIEFING NOTE: IS THERE A BUSINESS CASE FOR SMALL-SCALE AND LARGE-SCALE
WATER EXPORT TO THE UNITED STATES? 4 (2007), available at http://
www.policyresearch.gc.ca/doclib/BN_SD_BulkWater2_200610_e.pdf (―Relative
to the value-added bottled water and beverage industries, bulk water export
would employ very few Canadians per [cubic meter of water] exported. Thus,
beyond the initial construction phase, bulk exports would bring little employment to Canadians.‖).
124. Cf. NIKIFORUK, supra note 122 (discussing how exporting water would
be a detriment to the Canadian economy because their major industries, such
as agriculture, automobile manufacturing, wood, oil, and electricity are water
dependent, and how reducing the water supply would reduce the water at
home available to create jobs and maintain those industries).
125. See Charles F. Wilkinson, Western Water Law in Transition, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 317, 336 (1985).
126. E.g., GLEICK ET AL., supra note 56, at ii.
127. See David Aladjem, The Public Trust Doctrine: New Frontiers for Sustainable Water Resources Management, 25 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV‘T, Summer
2010, at 17 (―[ T ]he chief task of the next quarter century will be to attempt to
balance the various needs for water resources against each other.‖); Wilkinson,
supra note 125 (―The recognition of the public trust doctrine in water law is
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ever, given water‘s usufructuary nature,128 it makes particular
sense to extend the public trust doctrine‘s scope to the use of
the resource.129 Indeed, many jurisdictions apply the public
trust doctrine to management of water resources.130
The first major decision to apply the public trust doctrine
to water appropriation was National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County.131 In this case, the Supreme Court
of California expanded the public trust doctrine to include the
allocation of water rights in specific circumstances, even when
water had already been appropriated to a private party.132
In holding that the public trust doctrine applied in these
circumstances, the court looked both at the purpose and the
scope of the doctrine within the state.133 The court discussed
how the public‘s interest in water resources was not limited
simply by the traditional triad of uses.134 Instead, the goal of
the court in applying the doctrine was to protect water resources for their current public use.135 In their assessment of
the single strongest statement that historic uses must accommodate modern
needs.‖).
128. As discussed supra in the text accompanying notes 31–34, an interest
in water is usufructuary—meaning that it ―incorporates the needs of others.‖
Sax, supra note 82, at 485. It is thus necessary for the government to regulate
water use for the benefit of the public and to take account of the public nature
of the resource. See id.
129. See Sax, supra note 82, at 485 (noting that the usufructuary nature of
the resource makes it necessary for the government to regulate public uses
and that no other legal doctrine ―comes as close as does the public trust concept to providing a point of intersection for the‖ relevant interests (footnote
omitted)).
130. See Alexandra B. Klass, Adverse Possession and Conservation: Expanding Traditional Notions of Use and Possession, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 283,
320 n.184 (2006).
131. 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983); see also Aladjem, supra note 127 (describing
the use of the public trust doctrine in National Audubon Society to expand
public water protections).
132. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 728; see also Erik Swenson, Comment, Public Trust Doctrine and Groundwater Rights, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV.
363, 369 (1999) (―[ T ]he court . . . further expands the scope of the public trust
doctrine to include the allocation of water rights.‖).
133. See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 719.
134. Id. (defining the traditional triad as including navigation, commerce,
and fishing).
135. Id. (finding that ―one of the most important public uses of the tidelands‖ was ―the preservation of those lands in their natural state, so that they
may serve as ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and as environments which provide food and habitat for birds and marine life, and which
favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area‖ (quoting Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971))).
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the scope of the doctrine, the court held, as most American jurisdictions do, that ―the public trust is not limited by the reach
of the tides, but encompasses all navigable lakes and
streams.‖136
Since the court found that the public trust applied to navigable waterways, so long as the application was for modern
public uses, the court thought that integrating the appropriation system and the public trust doctrine was necessary.137 In
doing so, the court found that the public trust doctrine can
override the appropriations of waters both before and after a
permit is allocated.138 It also found that the state has a duty to
take the public trust into account when distributing permits
under the state‘s system of water appropriation.139 Courts in
other jurisdictions have followed the reasoning of the California
Supreme Court;140 however, this extension of the doctrine is
primarily in the western part of the country.141
In states that have extended the public doctrine to the area
of water appropriation, the legislature has a mandate to consider the public trust when distributing permits.142 However,
this is a limited remedy. Such application of the doctrine would
not solve the problems faced by bulk water export.143 In this
circumstance, the issuance and use of one permit could have
serious ramifications for the individual state, as well as the rest
of the country, because one permit could cause states to lose
traditional legal authority over water resources if NAFTA and
GATT are applied to bulk water export.144 Therefore, along
with illuminating traditional concerns associated with the pub136. Id.
137. Id. at 727–28.
138. See Swenson, supra note 132, at 371 (―According to the court, all property rights in water are nonvested rights subject to revocation by the state if
trust resources are harmed.‖).
139. See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 727–28.
140. See e.g., CWC Fisheries, Inc. v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115, 1118 (Alaska
1988); In re Wai‗ola O Moloka‗i, Inc., 83 P.3d 664, 693 (Haw. 2004); Shokal v.
Dunn, 707 P.2d 441, 450–52 (Idaho 1985). For a case that dealt with this issue
prior to National Audubon Society, see United Plainsmen Ass‘n v. N.D. State
Water Conservation Comm‘n, 247 N.W.2d 457, 463 (N.D. 1976).
141. See Aladjem, supra note 127, at 20 (discussing how ―the public trust
doctrine has become an accepted part of the legal landscape‖ in western
states).
142. See id. (describing the status of the public trust doctrine in several
states).
143. See id.
144. See id.
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lic trust doctrine, a more traditional remedy—nullifying this
type of sale—would also be necessary to solve the developing
problem.145 If the state must simply take the doctrine into account, the doctrine still allows the state to lose traditional authority over a resource which it holds for the people in trust.
Although there are shortcomings to the application of the
public trust doctrine in some states, progressive jurisdictions
provide important illustrations of how the doctrine can extend
beyond traditional water uses, as well as how a system can integrate a water rights regime with the public trust doctrine.
Regardless of the arguments made for extensions of this doctrine, there are many commentators and state courts that are
reluctant to extend the doctrine beyond its traditional use. The
next Section articulates that, while state courts rightly take a
limited approach to the public trust doctrine, in the context of
bulk water invocation of the doctrine is entirely consistent with
conservative judicial application.
B. JUDICIAL RELUCTANCE TO EXTEND THE PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINE BEYOND THE TRADITIONAL AREAS OF NAVIGABLE AND
TIDAL WATERS
Some state courts are disinclined to expand the public
trust doctrine beyond the traditional doctrine enunciated in Illinois Central.146 Critics have lodged three typical complaints
against extension of the public trust doctrine, including a concern that: the application undervalues the right to private
property; the doctrine gives a court authority over complex administrative decisions where it lacks expertise; and that the
doctrine has an undemocratic nature.147 However, traditional
concerns over the extension of this doctrine do not apply to the
same extent when discussing bulk water export.
A typical argument against extension of the public trust
doctrine is its unnecessary intrusion on both private property
rights and private conduct.148 For example, the New York
145. See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 455 (1892) (stating
that the contract was revocable because the land was held in trust).
146. See Kanner, supra note 90, at 78, 81.
147. Araiza, supra note 97, at 402–03.
148. See, e.g., George P. Smith II & Michael W. Sweeney, The Public Trust
Doctrine and Natural Law: Emanations Within a Penumbra, 33 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 307, 322– 41 (2006) (arguing that expansion of the public trust
doctrine to environmental protection not grounded in natural law traditions
would unnecessarily interfere with private property rights and result in improper judicial activism).
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Court of Appeals refused to extend the public trust doctrine to
nonnavigable waters because it feared injecting uncertainty into the investment of private property.149 Similarly, the Connecticut Supreme Court ruled that the public trust doctrine does
not extend to the use of public parks, citing a concern for unreasonable intrusion on private conduct.150
This concern does not, however, apply to the extension of
the public trust doctrine to the bulk water context for two reasons. First, because this is a developing market, courts would
not ―inject uncertainty‖ because there is always ambiguity and
uncertainty when new markets are created.151 In fact, courts
would achieve the opposite end. By applying the common law to
this water use, a court would create stability by ensuring the
current permitting system is not interrupted by international
agreements. Second, this intrusion is not ―unreasonable‖ because a right to water is usufruct, and private parties are on
notice that water rights are subject to the beneficial interest of
the public.152 Since permit applicants are on notice that the
state may limit the manner and method of appropriation for
the benefit of the state, it is reasonable for an applicant to assume that state power extends to the courts in ensuring the
public‘s interest is protected.153 Therefore, by extending the
doctrine to bulk water export, a court is simply enforcing both
the interest of other water right holders and the public generally by protecting the current legal water rights structure.
Another argument against the extension of the public trust
doctrine is that it gives courts with very little expertise the authority to affect and overrule technical administrative deci-

149. See Douglaston Manor, Inc. v. Bahrakis, 678 N.E.2d 201, 203–05 (N.Y.
1997).
150. Leydon v. Greenwich, 777 A.2d 552, 564 n.17 (Conn. 2001) (confirming
the private right to beach access but objecting to the claim that the doctrine
extends to town parks).
151. Cf. Michael Korybut, Article 9’s Incorporation Strategy and Novel,
New Markets for Collateral: A Theory of Non-Adoption, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 137,
168–72, 177 (2007) (discussing how new markets create legal uncertainty
about ―commercial reasonableness‖ in the Article 9 context).
152. See supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text.
153. See Geoffrey M. Craig, House Bill 1041 and Transbasin Water Diversions: Equity to the Western Slope or Undue Power to Local Government?, 66
U. COLO. L. REV. 791, 819 (1995) (―[W]ater right holders have always been on
notice that the police powers of the state may be reasonably exercised to limit
the manner and method of appropriation in furtherance of legitimate state interests such as health, welfare, and safety.‖).

2011]

BULK WATER EXPORT PROBLEM

761

sions.154 The structure of state legislative systems places a significant amount of authority in administrative agencies because of their knowledge and expertise in the field.155 Consequently, according to some commentators, when judges weigh
in on technically complex decisions in the application of laws,
judges should defer greatly to the expertise and decisionmaking capacity of administrative agencies.156
Fundamentally, this criticism does not apply to bulk water
exports because it is not necessary for courts to make expert
administrative assessments when applying the doctrine in this
circumstance. Instead, a court follows a more traditional approach because issuance of a permit for bulk water risks state
divestment of authority over water resources because of international treaty.157 This is similar to Illinois Central in that it is
not the effect on the environment that initiates the protection,
but the reality that the decision could result in the government
losing its ability to regulate a resource under its control.158
Thus, judges need not make complex scientific determinations
and courts can freely apply the doctrine based on the effect on
the public.
The third argument against extending the public trust doctrine is that it is undemocratic in nature.159 It has been argued
that the doctrine, when extended beyond traditional uses, becomes a tool to override the democratic process.160 Although the
problems with bulk water could be resolved within the state
legislative branch, the fact that one legislative or administrative decision could forever change the water-rights system tips
the scales toward application of the doctrine because it is applied to rectify the traditional concerns that traditionally call
for the use of the doctrine to protect the interest of the public.
This is true for two reasons.
154. Araiza, supra note 97, at 402–03.
155. See Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA
L. REV. 631, 688 (1986).
156. Id.
157. See supra Part I.B & C (discussing water rights in the United States
and placing these rights in the context of GATT and NAFTA).
158. See Klass, supra note 84, at 705.
159. Araiza, supra note 97, at 402–03.
160. See James L. Huffman, Trusting the Public Interest to Judges: A
Comment on the Public Trust Writings of Professors Sax, Wilkinson, Dunning
and Johnson, 63 DENV. U. L. REV. 565, 583 (1986) (concluding that the doctrine is a ―tool[ ] for political losers or for those seeking to avoid the costs of becoming political winners‖).
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First, this doctrine was applied by the Supreme Court in a
circumstance where the state government was going to divest
itself of authority to govern ―the whole of an area in which it
has responsibility to exercise its police power.‖161 Therefore, the
Court invoked the doctrine as a check on legislative power that
would have damaging effects on the public‘s ability to use specific kinds of resources.162 Since the legislative power in this case
would result in an unchangeable outcome,163 this circumstance
seems well suited for application of the public trust doctrine.
Second, permitting bulk water exports puts both historical
and future needs at risk because the industry does not provide
major benefits to the public.164 The international export of water does not provide significant infrastructure to improve regional economies or accommodate for increasing water needs.165
In addition, the export of bulk water may have serious environmental consequences leading to water shortages for the
people of a state.166 This is the foundation of traditional public
trust doctrine case law. The decision to offer full control of the
harbor in Illinois Central was particularly extreme because it
did not create any public development or produce more efficient
services for the public.167 This also favors application of the
public trust doctrine to bulk water exports because of the minimal benefits provided to the public in exchange for the state‘s
control of water resources.

161. Sax, supra note 82, at 489.
162. See, e.g., Danielle Spiegel, Student Article, Can the Public Trust Doctrine Save Western Groundwater?, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 412, 438 (2010).
163. Unless a change was made to GATT or NAFTA.
164. See POLICY RESEARCH INITIATIVE, supra note 123.
165. See GLEICK ET AL., supra note 56, at 11–12 (arguing that resources
like water that are sold as ―raw‖ goods, as opposed to value-added goods such
as bottled water, ―involve much less investment‖ in the home nation because
―little or no additional inputs are needed‖); NIKIFORUK, supra note 122 (exporting water in its raw form means ―less water at home to create jobs and
less water to sustain ecological services‖).
166. See MAUDE BARLOW, INT‘L FORUM ON GLOBALIZATION, BLUE GOLD:
THE GLOBAL WATER CRISIS AND THE COMMODIFICATION OF THE WORLD‘S WATER SUPPLY 5–14 (rev. ed. 2001) (discussing some of the consequences of overusing water). Although there is no guarantee that applicability of water resources would impact the environment, especially with the exceptions in the
GATT for ―exhaustible resources,‖ Nardone, supra note 54, at 200 (quoting
GATT, supra note 10, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262), this Note posits that the potential
harm to water resources is increased when a state loses its full ability to regulate the resource for the benefit of the public.
167. Sax, supra note 82, at 490, 495.
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Therefore, the distribution of water rights for bulk water
export provide the proper opportunity for courts to apply the
public trust doctrine because arguments against its use are not
sufficiently persuasive. Additionally, the issuance of a permit
for bulk water export echoes many traditional legal reasons to
protect the public from a legislative action. The extension of the
public trust doctrine would provide the most efficient manner
of avoiding the permanent consequences generated by the export of bulk water.
III. EXTENSION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO
DENY APPROPRATION OF WATER RIGHTS FOR BULK
WATER EXPORT
The export of bulk water calls for the extension of the public trust doctrine to protect the public from the potential consequences associated with international trade agreements. First,
the decision of state courts to extend the doctrine is appropriate
because water is already a public good for the purposes of water
allocations, therefore parties are on notice that their rights are
impacted by the public generally.168 Second, state courts decisions to extend the doctrine assuage the concern that government would distribute permits for a temporary financial gain
that is not in the best interest of the public.169 Last, the extension is supported by Supreme Court precedent because the
state is potentially divesting its traditional authority to regulate water resources to a foreign entity.170
A. EXTENSION OF THE DOCTRINE IS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE
WATER IS ALREADY A ―PUBLIC‖ GOOD FOR THE PURPOSES OF
WATER ALLOCATION AND PARTIES ARE ON NOTICE OF THOSE
PUBLIC RIGHTS
The public nature of water lends itself to application of the
public trust doctrine.171 Because an interest in water is usufruct, it is necessary for the government to regulate water use

168. See generally Sax, supra note 82, at 485 (discussing water and property rights outside the framework of bulk water).
169. See generally Klass, supra note 84, at 705 (discussing the public trust
doctrine as a check on government mismanagement of public resources outside
the framework of bulk water).
170. See generally Sax, supra note 82, at 489 (discussing state authority
over public areas outside the framework of bulk water).
171. See id. at 485.
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for the benefit of the public.172 In other words, most jurisdictions traditionally view water as ―public property subject to a
private use.‖173 While the use of the public trust doctrine has
customarily been defined under the terms of navigation, commerce, and fisheries, many scholars argue that trust theory is
sufficiently broad to encompass water rights more generally.174
In the case of bulk water, use of the doctrine is necessary to
protect the public‘s interest to the extent the state and local
governments fail to fulfill the their duty to the public.175 The
doctrine would protect the public from government decisions
that affect the long-term prosperity of the state‘s water resources by mandating the state fulfill its duty to issue water
rights only to the extent they do not hurt the rights of other users or the public.
B. EXTENSION OF THE DOCTRINE IS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE THE
GOVERNMENT‘S APPROPRIATION OF THE RIGHT TO A PRIVATE
PARTY MAY NOT BENEFIT THE PUBLIC
Bulk water exports illustrate an instance where the government may provide a benefit for a private party for shortterm economic gain that does not create significant benefits to
the public. This is similar to Illinois Central because there is no
indication the public would benefit from sale of the resource.176
The increase in demand for freshwater resources around the
world, coupled with the potential for water-rich areas to increase their revenue, will likely create the perfect storm for the
development of this market.177 As the market grows and technology develops, smaller public entities like Sitka, Alaska will
feel pressure to issue water permits to private companies to
172. See id.
173. Ronald B. Robie, The Public Interest in Water Rights Administration,
23 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 917, 923 (1977).
174. See, e.g., id. at 926–28. Some courts already extended the doctrine to
water rights. See supra Part II.A.2.
175. Robie, supra note 173, at 927–28.
176. See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892) (―The control
of the State . . . can never be lost, except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public therein, or can be disposed of without any
substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters remaining.‖); Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm‘n, 215 N.E.2d 114, 126 (Mass.
1966) (―[W]e find no express grant to the Authority of power to permit use of
public lands and of the Authority‘s borrowed funds for what seems, in part at
least, a commercial venture for private profit.‖).
177. See generally GLEICK ET AL., supra note 56, at 2 (describing the developing water crisis).
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profit from their resources. However, with a resource as valuable as water, it is necessary to ensure governmental bodies take
all relevant factors into account when determining whether the
financial incentives provided by shipping water overseas are
truly in the best interest of the state.
It is true that state and local governments can make money when allocating permits for bulk water export.178 However,
there is no evidence that bulk water exports would actually pay
the true worth of water to the people of the state.179 Nor is it
clear that exportation would provide jobs for people within the
state.180 Moreover, it may limit the economic opportunities for
citizens to build domestic industries.181 Therefore, the problems
created by bulk water allocation resemble those in Illinois Central in which the state‘s economic gain did not provide any
tangible benefits to the community.182 Thus, extension of the
public trust doctrine is the most reliable way to ensure allocation of water rights provides some kind of benefit to the community and that state governments properly address the impacts this export would have on society.

178. See, e.g., MARCEL BOYER, FRESHWATER EXPORTS FOR THE DEVELOPQUEBEC‘S BLUE GOLD 25 (2008), available at http://www.iedm.org/
files/cahier0808_en.pdf (finding that a project to export water at $0.65 per cubic meter could generate more than $16 billion in annual income for the province of Quebec).
179. Cf. Kristin M. Anderson & Lisa J. Gaines, International Water Pricing: An Overview and Historic and Modern Case Studies, in JEROME DELLI
PRISCOLI & AARON T. WOLF, MANAGING AND TRANSFORMING WATER CONFLICTS 249, 249–65 (2009) (discussing how the true cost of water must be
measured through consideration of operational and maintenance costs, capital
costs, opportunity costs, resource costs, social costs, environmental damage
costs, and long run marginal costs).
180. See James Feehan, Export of Bulk Water from Newfoundland and Labrador: A Preliminary Assessment of Economic Feasibility, in MINISTERIAL
COMM. EXAMINING THE EXP. OF BULK WATER, GOV‘T OF NFLD., EXPORT OF
BULK WATER FROM NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR 35, 62 (2001) (―For a
bulk-export-only operation, the employment levels would be quite modest,
perhaps in the tens of jobs, even in a moderately large operation.‖); NIKIFORUK, supra note 122 (discussing how the number of jobs created in a bulk water market for Canada would be ―minimal‖).
181. See NIKIFORUK, supra note 122 (discussing how reduced water may
mean reduced domestic industry).
182. See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892).
MENT OF
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C. EXTENSION OF THE DOCTRINE IS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE A
STATE IS POTENTIALLY DIVESTING ITS TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY
TO REGULATE WATER RESOURCES TO A FOREIGN ENTITY
When it comes to jurisdictions that declined to expand the
public trust to general water allocation, they should apply the
doctrine to bulk water export because of the serious consequences that may result from the state‘s divestment of a portion of its allocation power to a foreign entity.183 A government‘s issuance of a water right for bulk water export has more
serious consequences because the state action may result in the
transaction being regulated by NAFTA and GATT, resulting in
the loss of a state‘s ability to supervise the extraction of its water supply without outside interference.184
Again, this situation is similar to Illinois Central185 because of the state‘s loss of authority over the resource.186 When
applying the public trust doctrine to cases of general water allocation, a court simply requires a state to consider the public
trust when distributing water rights.187 The public trust is not
asserted to prevent the harm to the public caused by the loss of
regulatory control.188 When, however, it comes to bulk water
export, the State‘s authority to control water resources is in
jeopardy because one decision to export water could cause limitation of a state‘s authority to regulate water transfers within
its borders.189 It is, therefore, more similar to the sale of a har183. See supra Part I.C (arguing that international treaties may result in a
diminution of the state‘s traditional allocation power).
184. Id.
185. See supra Part II.A.1.
186. Compare Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 453 (voiding the grant of the harbor), with CWC Fisheries, Inc. v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115, 1117–18 (Alaska
1988) (stating that the regulatory agency must consider the public trust when
issuing permits), and Nat‘l Audubon Soc‘y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709,
727–28 (Cal. 1983) (stating that when issuing permits the regulatory agency
must consider the public trust doctrine), and In re Wai‗ola O Moloka‗i, Inc., 83
P.3d 664, 690–94 (Haw. 2004) (stating that the public trust doctrine must be
considered by a regulatory agency when issuing permits), and Shokal v. Dunn,
707 P.2d 441, 450 (Idaho 1985) (discussing Idaho‘s permit application system),
and United Plainsmen Ass‘n v. N.D. State Water Conservation Comm‘n, 247
N.W.2d 457, 463 (N.D. 1976) (articulating that the regulatory agency must
consider the public trust when issuing permits).
187. See, e.g., Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 727–28.
188. In water allocation cases the state retains the right to regulate. See,
e.g., id. at 728 (stating that after the state approves a water appropriation, the
―public trust imposes a duty of continuing supervision over the taking and use‖
of the water and that the state is ―not confined by past allocation decisions‖).
189. See supra Part I.C.
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bor in that the State cannot regain control of the resource without alternative means.190 As such, more traditional jurisdictions should extend the doctrine because of the more serious
consequences associated with bulk water export.
Therefore, the public trust doctrine should be extended to
bulk water sales in order to protect the public from the potential consequences associated with international trade agreements. Expansion is warranted in even the most conservative
jurisdictions because: water is already a public good for the
purposes of water allocations;191 state court decisions to extend
the doctrine assuage the concern that government would distribute permits for a temporary financial gain;192 and the extension is supported by Supreme Court precedent because the
state is potentially divesting its traditional authority to regulate water resources to a foreign entity.193
CONCLUSION
If NAFTA and the GATT become applicable to United
States water resources, states may lose their authority to regulate these important resources. The best method for preventing
this limitation is for states to deny permits for extraction of the
resource for bulk water sale. However, because state governments have a short-term financial interest in selling permits,
an additional check is necessary to protect the public‘s interest
in these resources. Therefore, even more conservative jurisdictions should apply the public trust doctrine to prevent the issuance of bulk water permits. This is the best solution because
water is already ―public‖ for the purposes of water allocation,
the benefits provided to society by the state‘s issuance of this
kind of permit are minimal, and the consequence of permitting
could result in the divestment of traditional authority to regulate water resources. Additionally, this application is different
from liberal extensions for water allocation because it does not
implicate concerns about undervaluing private property, giving
courts authority over complex administrative decisions, or being too ―undemocratic.‖ As such, even conservative jurisdictions
should apply the public trust doctrine to protect the water resources of the United States from this dramatic loss of authority.
190.
191.
192.
193.

See Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 453.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part III.C.

